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Abstract—Nowadays integrated circuit reliability is challenged 
by both variability and working conditions. Environmental radi-
ation has become a major issue when ensuring the circuit correct 
behavior. The required radiation and later analysis performed to 
the circuit boards is both fund and time expensive. The lack 
of tools which support pre-manufacturing radiation hardness 
analysis hinders circuit designers tasks. This paper describes an 
extensively customizable simulation tool for the characterization 
of radiation effects on electronic systems. The proposed tool can 
produce an in depth analysis of a complete circuit in almost any 
kind of radiation environment in affordable computation times. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Nowadays radiation tolerance of electronic circuits is be-
coming a hot topic for several reasons. First, there is a clear 
need of protecting electronic systems from radiation in specific 
environments: nuclear plants, particle accelerators and satellite 
or space missions. Second, with CMOS coming deep in the 
nanometer regime, the reliability of integrated circuits has 
become a major issue for circuit designers. It has been reported 
for SRAMs that the single-bit soft error rate decreases with 
scaling whereas the multi-bit single event rate (SER) increases 
dramatically [1]. 
Circuit designers lack of radiation analysis or simulation 
tools to check robustness of the radiation hardness techniques 
they implement. Circuits need to be fully implemented and go 
to expensive radiation tests in acceleration facilities, making 
the design cycle extremely long, expensive and unafordable 
for most companies. In this scenario, systematic analysis 
methods and tools that emulate the effects of radiation in 
electronic circuits are required. In this work we present a 
tool that satisfies these needs, providing a fast, reliable and 
customizable radiation analysis for any kind of circuit. The 
proposed tool carries out a complete analysis that allows 
the study of the damage caused by a single event transients 
(SET), the possible single event upsets (SEUs) generated and 
their propagation through the circuit paths. The tool has been 
conceived to provide two main targets: 
• Conscientious analysis and search of the weakest 
circuit modules, allowing the designer to strengthen 
them before sending the manufactured circuit to a 
physical radiation test. 
• Detection of the critical amount of charge that, in-
jected at each node, produces a functional error. This 
functionality is especially interesting when designing 
circuits which can be exposed to different radiation 
environments. 
To fulfill the above objectives the tool systematically ana-
lyzes the circuit structure at the transistor level (netlist), injects 
a simulated radiation at each susceptible circuit instance and 
easily determines the circuit critical module which is most 
sensitive to radiation. 
Particle impact modeling, especially SETs generation and 
propagation through devices, has been studied in several publi-
cations [2]-[6]. However, the reliability-performance trade-off 
limits the scope of those techniques when applied to circuits 
bigger than a small quantity of transistors [7]. Other articles 
describe single event upsets (SEUs), generated by one or more 
SETs, as well as their propagation over HDL circuit models 
[8], [9]. Although the circuit range gets extended by this kind 
of analysis, their binary treatment leaves out deeper analysis 
such as how one or more SETs break into a SEU. This paper 
proposes a new radiation simulation tool to solve those needs. 
The simulation tool carries out a previous analysis of the 
circuit, detecting the nodes/instances susceptible of being catch 
up by a particle impact. Afterwards our tool systematically 
simulates radiation of the circuit finding the weakest modules 
and nodes. Not only does it find the most sensitive areas 
but it also determines the critical charge with which, at each 
impacted node/circuit instance, a SEU will be generated. 
The paper is structured as follows. The main modules and 
functionalities of the tool are described in section II. Section 
III contains a detailed example of use, describing the radiation 
tool capabilities. Finally, some conclusions are drawn. 
II. TOOL DESCRIPTION 
This section describes the available radiation schemes, the 
main modules and functionalities of the proposed tool (shown 
in figure 1), and the radiation analysis key points (radiation 
error detection and granularity considerations). 
A. Radiation Schemes 
Our radiation tool considers two powerful radiation 
schemes which, following the configurability provided, model 
almost any kind of SET phenomena. The designer can choose 
one of the following approaches: 
• Injection Scheme. The tool places a current source at 
each node susceptible of being radiated. The current 
source injects any waveform the user defines in order 
to accurately materialize the ion/wave impact. Most 
commonly used waveforms refer to the double expo-
nential, PWD signals or simple pulses [4], [6], [8]. 
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Fig. 1. Circuit Radiation Tool Flow Graph. The modular-system is represented along the required inputs and the generated outputs. 
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Fig. 2. Substitution scheme examples: a) Bias dependent radiation subcircuit 
scheme [5] and b) Switch controlled radiation scheme [3]. 
• Substitution Scheme. The tool replaces any instance 
susceptible of being radiated with the instance of a 
radiated subcircuit. This radiation scheme allows our 
radiation tool to use complex radiation sources. Highly 
dependent on the technology, the accurate results of 
these radiation schemes usually rely on a previous 
calibration. Figure 2 shows two examples of this kind 
of sources: Bias dependent radiation subcircuit scheme 
[5] and switch controlled radiation scheme [3]. Many 
other complex models can be included using this 
approach such as [2]. 
For convenience, whenever we talk about radiation within 
the tool this means an emulated radiation occurrence. 
B. Tool Description 
A key feature in our radiation tool is its configurability 
through XML configuration files. The user can customize the 
program with several technologies and simulation options. 
In addition, the radiation environment definition is highly 
moldable, allowing the full customization of radiation impacts 
modeling. Besides these features, several simulation granular-
ity/refinement fields, as shown in table I, are available to the 
user, incrementing the amount and types of target circuits to 
be analyzed. 
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Let's describe the proposed radiation tool structure, repre-
sented in figure 1. It is composed of four main modules: 
1) Circuit Analysis: This module is responsible of accu-
rately parsing the input, Spectre netlists, to an assemble set 
of circuit instances structured as relational trees. Afterwards 
inheritance analysis takes place, organizing the different circuit 
elements, analysis and control statements and building rela-
tional tree structures. 
Radiation Scheme 
"hJf-
Target circuit 
X 
9_ i 
ibuff j i_buff_2 
^ - > - ^ » -ZL 
T 
_jf 
i alt 1 1 i buff 2 
-M>-^H> 
A 
^ ¿T 
Radiated Netlists 
i buff 1 i alt 1 2 
^H>--M> 
B 
^ L 
T 
r n 
iT 
i alt 2 1 i buff 2 
^ > - - » - k <T 
i buff 1 i alt 2 2 
^>^>-^^> 
T 
Fig. 4. Modifiers Example. 
Finally, this module performs an instance dependency 
analysis which is required by the radiation algorithm. The 
dependency analysis allows, as shown in figure 3, to directly 
access the primitives, (analog) models, subcircuits etc. by-
passing non-desired statements and providing a useful search 
engine. 
2) Circuit Modifiers: This module radiates the golden 
circuit at each element (node or instance) susceptible of being 
radiated by introducing a modifier which emulates radiation. 
The radiation algorithm recursively searches among the circuit 
elements independently of the number of levels the circuit has. 
Each radiation occurrence gets translated into a new altered 
netlist which is independently simulated and analyzed. The 
tool makes use of the relational data structures to find those 
perceptible nodes, and to propagate the radiation occurrence 
to dependent instances on upper levels of the circuit. 
Figure 4 illustrates the way the modifiers work. The golden 
circuit contains two buffer subcircuit instances: i_buf f_l 
and i_buf f_2. Each buffer instance is composed of a chain 
of two inverters. The selected radiation scheme is node injec-
tion. For simplicity, we will consider both v_in, vdd and gnd 
as not-susceptible of being radiated nodes. 
The alteration process is as follows: 
1) The tool finds the first susceptible node of being 
modified by the injected radiation: the output of the 
first inverter in the buffer i_buf f_ l . The modifiers 
create an altered buffer subcircuit in which the first 
inverter is radiated a l t _ l . Right after this the mod-
ifiers substitute the original instance, i _ b u f f _ l , 
with the radiated one, i _ a l t _ l _ l and export the 
radiated netlist (A). 
2) Before injecting any other circuit node, the modifiers 
propagate the subcircuit buffer alteration through the 
circuit: the buffer i_buf f_2 gets substituted by 
i _ a l t _ l _ 2 and a new radiated netlist is generated 
(B). 
3) No more buffer instances are found, and therefore 
the modifiers radiate the next susceptible node, the 
second inverter of the first buffer i_buf f_ l . A new 
altered buffer subcircuit is created, a l t _ 2 , and the 
instance i_buf f_l is replaced by a radiated one 
i _ a l t _ 2 _ l giving another radiated netlist (C). 
4) The modifiers propagate the last subcircuit buffer 
alteration: the second instance buffer i _buf f_2 
is substituted by a radiated instance i _ a l t _ 2 _ 2 , 
generating the last netlist (D). 
Fig. 5. Example of user defined signal regions in a 1.1V fed ring oscillator 
circuit: a) Blue region for vdd values, b) Red region for gnd values, c) Yellow 
region for transitions. 
At this point no more nodes are susceptible of being radiated, 
and four different altered netlists emulating a SET occurrence 
at different places are ready to be simulated. 
3) Simulations Handler: This module independently man-
ages the simulation of each altered circuit generated by the 
previous module. It communicates with Spectre circuit sim-
ulator, concurrently handling every scenario simulation and 
redirecting the outputs to the Results Analysis module. In case 
that any simulation unexpectedly ends or an error occurs, the 
Simulations Handler reports the incident to the user. Otherwise, 
the transient results are ready to be analyzed. 
4) Radiation Results Analysis: This module interpolates 
the results from the simulated scenarios and compares them 
with the golden circuit response. The error detection algorithm, 
explained in detail in section II-C, decides whether or not the 
radiation occurrence has become a functional error. 
With the aim of finding the critical amount of charge 
with which the radiation occurrence at a given node produces 
a circuital error, this module interacts with the Simulations 
Handler; depending on the existence of an error, it will 
increase/decrease the total amount of charge in the next 
simulation until it finds, with a predefined accuracy, the critical 
value that generates that error. 
At this point, the tool analyzes each node susceptible of 
being radiated, and determines which of them, and with which 
critical charge, are sensitive to radiation. Right after this, the 
tool automatically generates the documentation related to the 
radiation capabilities. 
C. Radiation Error Detection 
Independently on its size, each circuit module should 
handle a different definition of radiation error relying on the 
function it develops. For example, it is reasonable that for a 
memory unit the radiation error gets defined by a bit flip. On 
the other hand, on a given analog processing path the radiation 
error could mean a small voltage difference with a duration 
long enough to be propagated to the next unit. 
The proposed radiation tool gives the user the required 
weapons to decide which signals should be defined as ob-
servables. A functional error is defined by the comparison of 
those observable signals within a radiated circuit against the 
pertinent ones in the golden (non-radiated) circuit. The field 
Analyzed Magnitudes/Signals in table I contains several user 
defined customization options to set up this comparison: 
• Set of observable signals. 
• Thresholds and absolute error margins. 
• The minimum length of the event to be considered 
as an error (time span) is also configurable. Punctual 
errors can also be managed. 
Therefore, the tool proceeds to independently compare each 
observable signal with the same one in the golden scenario. 
If the difference between them exceeds a predefined value, 
whether it is punctual or maintained in time, a radiation error 
is considered. With this configurability, the user can define, for 
instance, when a SET becomes a SEU. 
To improve the accuracy of the analysis the tool allows 
the consideration of up to three different sets of comparison 
parameters depending on the value of the analyzed magnitude. 
Additionally, the user can independently tune the values of 
the different customizable fields for each region. Figure 5 
shows an example with three regions shown in colors while 
evaluating the voltage at the same node of a ring oscillator. In 
this scenario the first region, gnd values in red, has an absolute 
error value of erra and considers errors with lengths greater 
than ta. The second region, between the thresholds Tha and 
T/15 (in yellow) has a different absolute error value, err^, and 
considers punctual errors. The last region, vdd values in blue, 
has an absolute error value of errc and considers errors with 
lengths greater than tc. Under this configuration, a radiation 
error is found at 2ns simulation time. 
D. Granularity 
A key point during any radiation simulation is the compu-
tation time, which dramatically increases when dealing with 
large circuits. Despite the proposed schematic simulation takes 
advantage of simpler models, especially when compared with 
TCAD-like simulations, the computation time remains as a key 
factor. We propose the use of a granularity strategy, analyzing 
several modules independently and extrapolating the radiation-
hardness properties to upper levels. Figure 6 represents an 
example of this strategy. First of all the user simulates and 
extracts the radiation properties of the individual modules, 
in this case, the two different buffers bu f f and my_buff 
with critical charges Q\ and Q2 respectively. Now, the user 
extrapolates those properties to the whole circuit. The circuit 
critical amount of charge will be Qbuff_pair = min(QiJQ2)-
In the second stage, making use of the customization 
capabilities, the user analyzes the remaining modules of the 
circuit omitting the pair of buffer instances saving computa-
tional resources. If instead of only having a pair of buffers 
we had a larger number, the computation time saved using 
this strategy would be determinant, allowing the simulation of 
larger circuits. 
However, when considering not only combinational mod-
ules, we need to take into account the delays induced between 
modules. The signals registration will be delayed by the previ-
ous modules propagation time. Therefore, the SEU generation 
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Fig. 7. DICE flip-flop schematic presented in [10]. 
will depend on the time the SET occurs, and so the value Qcrit 
will depend on time becoming the function Qcrit(t)- Section 
III deals with this issue. 
III. EXAMPLE OF USE 
This section contains a guided example which shows the 
proposed tool capabilities. We have chosen two different flip-
flop circuits to analyze their hardness against radiation. Relying 
on the radiation tool, we will determine the radiation hardness 
of the two of them. The first circuit is a twelve standard 
flip-flop, built on 40nra technology. The second circuit is a 
hardened flip-flop with a dual interlocked cell (DICE) structure 
[10]. The hardening principle is described in figure 7, where 
the latch is improved by using the dual interlocked feedback 
circuitry underneath. Clock edges are always subject to error 
when dealing with timed modules. The DICE flip-flop should 
be more robust in non-clock transition instants, and we are 
make use of our tool to measure that improvement. 
The first step is the experiment configuration: 
• Technology: 40nra TSMC. 
• Definition of the module timing: 10ns clock period. 
/./ 
0 
..A.. 
0ns 10ns 20ns 
Fig. 8. Radiation impacts in the analyzed registers. 
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TABLE II. STANDARD REGISTER. CRITICAL CHARGE AT EACH NODE 
VARYING THE PARTICLE TIME OF IMPACT. • : NOT AFFECTED BY THE 
MAXIMUM CHARGE ( I E - 11C) . ABMC: AFFECTED BY THE MINIMUM 
CHARGE ( I E - 14C) 
tí (ns) 
2.5 
5 
7.5 
12.5 
15 
17.5 
tí (ns) 
2.5 
5 
7.5 
12.5 
15 
17.5 
Node 0 
3.05E-012 
ABMC 
ABMC 
Node 6 
1.30E-12 
1.55E-14 
3.56E-14 
Node 1 
ABMC 
ABMC 
Node 7 
1.91E-14 
6.12E-14 
Node 2 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
Node 8 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
Node 3 
3.8E-14 
4.54E-14 
Node 9 
1.55E-14 
ABMC 
ABMC 
Node 4 
3.90E-13 
2.04E-14 
1.67E-14 
1.38E-12 
8.44E-12 
9.06E-12 
Node 10 
1.55E-14 
1.55E-14 
3.56E-14 
Node 5 
9.69E-012 
1.51E-13 
1.43E-14 
Node 11 
ABMC 
ABMC 
TABLE III. DICE REGISTER. CRITICAL CHARGE AT EACH NODE 
VARYING THE PARTICLE TIME OF IMPACT. • : NOT AFFECTED BY THE 
MAXIMUM CHARGE ( I E - 11C) . ABMC: AFFECTED BY THE MINIMUM 
CHARGE ( I E - 14C) 
tí (ns) 
2.5 
5 
7.5 
12.5 
15 
17.5 
tí (ns) 
2.5 
5 
7.5 
12.5 
15 
17.5 
tí (ns) 
2.5 
5 
7.5 
12.5 
15 
17.5 
Node 0 
•k 
•k 
•k 
1.03E-13 
2.27E-12 
2.27E-12 
Node 6 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
Node 12 
* 
* 
* 
* 
Node 1 
•A-
•A-
•A-
•A-
•A-
•A-
Node 7 
•A-
•A-
•A-
•A-
•A-
•A-
Node 13 
4.98E-13 
4.54E-14 
1.53E-12 
•A-
•A-
•A-
Node 2 
•A-
•A-
•A-
•A-
•A-
•A-
Node 8 
•A-
•A-
•A-
•A-
•A-
•A-
Node 14 
6.15E-13 
2.4E-14 
•A-
•A-
•A-
•A-
Node 3 
•A-
•A-
•A-
•A-
•A-
•A-
Node 9 
•A-
•A-
•A-
1.3E-12 
1.22E-12 
1.3E-12 
Node 15 
•A-
•A-
•A-
•A-
ABMC 
•A-
Node 4 
•A-
•A-
•A-
•A-
•A-
•A-
Node 10 
•A-
•A-
•A-
•A-
•A-
•A-
Node 16 
•A-
•A-
•A-
•A-
•A-
•A-
Node 5 
•A-
•A-
•A-
1.91E-14 
2.04E-14 
•A-
Node 11 
•A-
•A-
•A-
•A-
•A-
•A-
Node 17 
•A-
•A-
•A-
•A-
ABMC 
1.03E-13 
TABLE IV. CRITICAL CHARGE AT EACH NODE, NUMBER OF SENSITIVE 
NODES AND RATIO BETWEEN SENSITE NODES AND NODES SUSCEPTIBLE 
OF BEING RADIATED FOR EACH REGISTER SCHEME. 
Standard 
tí (ns) 
2.5 
5 
7.5 
12.5 
15 
17.5 
# Sensitive Nodes 
6 
5 
4 
7 
5 
2 
Ratio 
0.5 
0.42 
0.33 
0.85 
0.42 
0.17 
Min Qa 
1.55E-14 
ABMC 
ABMC 
ABMC 
ABMC 
3.56E-14 
DICE 
tí (ns) 
2.5 
5 
7.5 
12.5 
15 
17.5 
# Sensitive Nodes 
2 
2 
1 
3 
5 
3 
Ratio 
0.11 
0.11 
0.05 
0.17 
0.28 
0.17 
Min Qc 
4.98E-13 
2.4E-14 
1.53E-12 
1.91E-14 
ABMC 
1.03E-13 
Sequential Circuits Granularity Considerations 
When dealing with granularity capabilities, we introduced 
in section II-D some considerations regarding sequential cir-
cuits. 
Let's consider a new scenario with a chain of five DICE 
registers which maintains the same timing as the example be-
fore. In case we want to extrapolate the radiation characteristics 
of the single DICE analysis, we should not consider the worst 
cases of the isolated register alone but as an ensemble of timed 
modules. Otherwise, two different consequences can appear: 
1) If the SEU at the output of the first register does 
not meet the rising edge of the clock signal, it is not 
captured by the second register, shown in figure 9. 
2) If the SET inside the first register does not produce a 
SEU (it is not long enough), but it matches the rising 
edge of the clock signal, a SEU might occur in the 
second register, as shown in figure 10. 
Even if the probability of impact in a specific node at the 
worst time could be really small, regarding sequential circuits 
we should consider the critical amount of collected charge as 
a time dependent function Qcru{t). For a simple chain of two 
Particle impact modeling: We will use the double 
exponential injection scheme [8] in which the particle 
impact generates a current at the impacted node with 
the form 
H n j 
/ ^ ( e - C t - t O / r ^ e - C t - t O / n )
 ( 1 ) 
la = Qcoii/(T2 -n). (2) 
Parameters T\ and T2 depend on the technology. 
During our experiment we will consider the values 
T1 = 1E- l l (s) and T2 = 2E - 10(s). QcoU refers 
to the collected charge at the impacted node. The last 
parameter, t¿, is the particle impact instant. 
• Maximum and minimum charge range: In our experi-
ment, this parameter will vary between IE - ÍAC and 
IE-IIC. 
• Definition of the particle impact instants t¿: between 
2.5ns and 17.5ns avoiding the situations when both 
clock and input have transitions, as shown in figure 8. 
• Observable signals: The chosen observable signal is 
the output of each flip-flop. 
• Definition of our circuit radiation error. We will 
consider a radiation error as the occurrence of a non-
desired bit flip due a particle impact. This bit change 
should at least last Ins to be considered a SEU. 
• Definition of injectable circuit components and nodes. 
Each component is susceptible of being radiated. 
Each node but the output, our observable signal, is 
susceptible of being impacted by a particle. 
With the above configuration we proceed to simulate the 
experiment. After the radiation analysis, the results extracted 
from the report confirm the radiation robustness of the DICE 
scheme facing the standard flip-flop shown in [10]. Tables II 
and III summarize the results ordered by the circuit modules 
internal nodes. From its thorough analysis we extract the data 
summary shown in table IV which supports the DICE radiation 
resistance regarding the standard register: DICE structures, 
even having more nodes perceptible of being radiated, present 
a better radiation hardness behavior. 
Moreover, we also deduce the worst impact time U at which 
our module is more sensitive. As expected, clock rising edges 
are the most sensitive instants (5ns, 15ns). 
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Fig. 9. The SEU generated in the first register will not be propagated to the 
second one. The SEU length is not long enough to be captured in the next 
clock edge (20ns). 
Fig. 10. The SEU generated in the first register at time 20ns has been 
propagated till the output of our registers chain. 
registers, being Qreg(t) each register critical charge, and dreg 
the delay between its input and output, we would consider 
Qpair, the critical charge of the module, as 
^pair\L) Jmin\^reg\L): ^¿reg\^ ^reg)) (3) 
However, the complexity of equation 3 grows depending on 
the number of register stages, complicating the calculus of the 
amount of charge that would destabilize our circuit behavior. 
Once again our radiation tool proves useful systematically 
solving the problem: The design space exploration of the 
five stage chain, involving fifty impacted nodes analyzed at 
six different instants was swiftly computed. It took over five 
minutes of a virtualized bicore Intel i7 with 8GB RAM 
to generate the radiation results shown in table V. As was 
predictable, some SEUs were corrected by posterior stages 
(2.5ns impact time). In other cases some SET propagations 
ended up becoming a SEU which previously was not present. 
TABLE V. DICE CHAIN SUMMARY. 
tí (ns) 
2.5 
5 
7.5 
12.5 
15 
17.5 
# Sensitive nodes 
0 
11 
7 
2 
10 
5 
Min Qc 
* 
2.16E-14 
2.03E-14 
1.91E-14 
ABMC 
4.78E-14 
IV. CONCLUSIONS 
Radiation has become a serious problem in current circuit 
reliability. Circuit designers require tools for the validation 
of the designs before being manufactured, saving costs and 
time. In this paper we have presented a useful radiation 
simulation tool which solves those circuit designers needs. A 
fast, powerful and reliable application framework that allows 
the user to test the circuit radiation hardness and allows finding 
the weakest modules in the circuit. The proposed radiation tool 
is fully customizable, allowing the user to model a wide range 
of radiation environments. Finally a representative example 
validated the tool and has illustrated its capabilities. 
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